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Summary 
The most recent incarnation of South Africa’s land reform is a model of state purchase of 
farms to be provided on leasehold, rather than transferring title. This briefing presents 
headline findings from our field research in one district. 
 
Introduction 
South Africa’s land reform is in flux – and, arguably, in crisis. We argue here that the wide- 
spread criticism of its slow pace fails to capture the extent of this crisis. Our argument 
follows from that of Lionel Cliffe (2000), who pointed out that land redistribution was 
constrained not merely by the constitutional settlement and protection of private property, 
nor by the World Bank’s market-based land reform formula of the 1990s. More 
profoundly, he argued, the manner in which redistribution was practised was 
‘constricted by old-fashioned “modernist” (and often implicitly colonial) orthodoxies still 
current in South Africa’ (Cliffe 2000, 273). This briefing shows how, years later and 
after several policy shifts, these orthodoxies have shaped a contorted reform, centred 
on criteria of commercial ‘viability’ and governed by state officials, consultants and 
agribusiness ‘strategic partners’ concerned with surveillance and control of 
‘beneficiaries’ in ‘projects’ with precarious tenure on un-subdivided commercial farms 
now owned by the state. This is a far cry from the vision of land reform restructuring the 
countryside and establishing a major smallholder class with independent and secure land 
rights. 
 
Since the National Land Summit of 2005 where, at least discursively, the government 
abandoned the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ approach (Hall 2005), a raft of new policies 
and laws has been developed. Proposed new laws and policies that, as of mid 2016, are 
under preparation or under consideration, in public consultations and in parliament, 
include measures to introduce land ceilings, to prohibit new purchases by foreigners, 
and to introduce race and gender information in the national deeds registry (Regulation 
of Land Holdings Bill); to limit the subdivision of high-potential agricultural land 
(Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Framework Bill); to transfer 
ownership of customary land in the former ‘reserves’ or Bantustans to ‘traditional 
communities’ and entrench the powers of traditional leaders in its governance 
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(Communal Land Tenure Bill); to introduce equity ownership schemes for long-term 
farm workers (Strengthening the Relative Rights of People Working the Land Policy); to 
promote allocation of small plots to the landless (One Household, One Hectare Policy). 
 
Across all of these, the precise class agenda and vision for agrarian reform has become 
obscured. Who is the target for land reform: an emerging commercial class of black 
capitalist farmers or the rural poor, farm workers and small-scale farmers? Is the aim 
to promote and defend large land holdings or to promote their subdivision to make 
available smallholdings? Should rights be vested in rural households or in traditional 
councils? And what is the role of state ownership and state land administration, as an 
alternative to private ownership? As contradictions emerge in these new policy 
directions, the foundational logic of land reform is being inverted. 
 
This briefing addresses the changes in processes of land redistribution specifically, 
presenting headline findings from field research in one district, to raise questions about 
the political and economic implications of the latest incarnation of land reform policy 
in South Africa. Our aim is to investigate and analyse how land redistribution is 
progressing, specifically the state’s purchase-and-lease approach. We provide a brief 
review of how land redistribution has evolved, and the various policy shifts and 
adjustments since the 1990s as background. Next we discuss our rationale, objectives 
and research questions; research design, sample selection and methods; and highlight 
five key findings from the research. While we will report more fully on our research in 
due course, the disturbing patterns of state control, state neglect and elite capture that we 
discovered merit urgent attention. 
 
The shift to state purchase and leasing 
Land redistribution policy and practice have undergone profound changes over the past 20 
years. Among these is the shift away from state-assisted land purchase and transfer of title 
to beneficiaries – the model advanced by the World Bank in the early 1990s (Binswanger 
and Deininger 1996) and adopted by the ruling African National Congress as policy in 
1997 (DLA 1997). In the early years this took the form of small grants to poor households 
to buy modest areas of land for settlement and small-scale farming. From 2000 onwards, 
under President Thabo Mbeki, a new policy promoted black capitalist farmers, providing 
larger land purchase subsidies to those with their own means to engage in commercial 
production. This, it was argued, would prevent patterns of overcrowding and under- 
utilisation of land evident in the first phase, but produced high levels of indebtedness 
among the new capitalist farmers. From 2011, under President Jacob Zuma, the state 
has adapted the willing buyer, willing seller approach; now the state has itself become 
the purchaser of land, acquiring land for redistribution to beneficiaries without transfer 
of title. State leasehold has replaced the original private ownership model. But with 
what consequences? And to what degree has this significant change helped to remedy 
the many problems of the initial programme or produced new problems? 
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The state leasehold model has been implemented in a variety of ways in different parts of 
the country, guided by a Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS), which empowers state 
officials to buy farms on the open market and allocate them to selected beneficiaries (DLA 
2006). This was initially for a three-year test period after which title would be transferred to 
‘emergent farmers’ who had proven themselves to be successful. However, after widespread 
non-payment of rent, the promise of eventual title has been abandoned. From 2011, state 
land purchase and leasing has come to constitute the entirety of land redistribution, as 
grant-based purchase was discontinued. The state leasehold model has since been 
amended through the State Land Lease and Disposal Policy (SLLDP) of 2013 that 
established a principle that black farming households and communities may obtain 30- 
year leases, renewable for a further 20 years, before the state will consider transferring 
ownership to them (DRDLR 2013a). To qualify for on-farm infrastructure and production 
support, under a Recapitalisation and Development Programme, ‘beneficiaries’ are 
required to enter into a partnership with a ‘strategic partner’ – i.e., a farming or 
agribusiness company – in a mentorship or joint venture arrangement (DRDLR 2013b). 
 
Government appears to have no clear system to ration public resources, since it abolished 
the land reform grants that enabled people to buy land for themselves. While funds 
allocated to land reform have been in decline, most of the budget – in the region of R2 
billion1 each year – is spent on the state’s Agricultural Landholding Account to fund 
land acquisition for redistribution under this leasehold model. Who will get how much 
of the shrinking land-reform pie? In the absence of land reform grants, there is huge 
disparity in who gets what. In some cases, a sizeable community may get a small farm, 
while in other cases government buys a large farm with substantial infrastructure and even 
livestock, and gives it to a single family. The result is that some beneficiaries receive 
nothing other than occupation of farms, some of which are dilapidated, while others 
receive valuable farms as going concerns with infrastructure, equipment and livestock. 
This practice is seen as arbitrary and unfair, and generates mistrust and suspicion 
among beneficiaries regarding government decision-making and the basis on which 
officials allocate resources. 
 
Rationale, objectives and research questions 
The rationale for our study was to find out if the current policy approach is achieving the 
aims of land reform and addressing the problems that were identified with previous 
programmes. Our purpose was to contribute evidence and analysis to the lively public 
debate on land issues. National government, parliament and the South African public at 
large know very little about what is happening on the ground. The voices of those who 
do know – including state officials responsible for implementation and beneficiaries 
themselves – are generally absent from the political debates under way, and research can 
help to foreground their experiences and understandings. There are detailed sets of studies 
in the literature about other aspects of land reform, including restitution (Walker et al. 
2010), earlier phases of redistribution (Aliber et al. 2013), farm workers and evictions 
(Wegerif, Russell, and Grundling 2005) and communal tenure (Claassens and Cousins 
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2009), and land reform and land use in general (McCusker, Moseley, and Ramutsindela 
2016). However, with one known exception (Ranwedzi 20122), there is a complete 
dearth of academic research on this latest wave of redistribution. We aim through this 
ongoing research to start to address this gap and to encourage more critical scholarly 
engagement on the topic. Our research objectives were threefold. First, we aimed to 
investigate the state’s practices and approaches with regards to land acquisition, the 
selection of beneficiaries and support for farmers. We asked what factors shape 
decisions regarding land acquisition and how the needs of beneficiaries are matched 
with land available. We also ask what land tenure rights beneficiaries have acquired, 
what land uses are being promoted, what support is provided to the beneficiaries and by 
whom. Second, we aimed to explore and derive lessons regarding the impact of PLAS on 
the farmers who are beneficiaries of the scheme. This involved assessing the extent to 
which they perceive their land tenure as being secure, given that the state does not 
transfer the land title to them. We also asked how their perception of tenure security 
affects their farming practices and land use, investment decisions, and therefore the 
benefits they can derive from the land they acquired. Third, we aimed to understand 
how government actors and beneficiaries see PLAS in terms of the overall goal of land 
reform that includes redressing historical land injustice and social and economic 
inequality. In answering this question, we explored how the purposes of land 
redistribution are understood both by state actors and by beneficiaries. 
 
Research design, sample selection and methods 
The study was conducted in response to a request from the Portfolio Committee on 
Agriculture in the Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature. We focused on one district, 
Sarah Baartman District, and conducted in-depth investigations of 11 projects during a 
series of fieldwork visits over a period of three years. We adopted a qualitative, field-
based research design, selecting cases from the database of the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform (DRDLR). Our sampling frame aimed to achieve as 
diverse a sample as possible. For our purposive sample, we used selection criteria that 
included projects that involve larger and smaller land sizes, higher and lower purchase 
prices, larger and smaller beneficiary numbers, diverse land uses, and to cover sites in 
several local municipalities within the district. We have no reason to believe that our 
sample misrepresents the wider reality within the district, although this cannot be 
definitively concluded in the absence of wider post-acquisition monitoring. We make no 
claim as to whether the findings reflect patterns in other districts and provinces, but 
contribute our findings in order to raise questions about wider patterns at the national 
level. 
 
We aimed not merely to derive field-based research findings but to engage on this basis 
with beneficiaries and officials. We therefore adopted an iterative process of ‘action 
research’, which involved interviewing beneficiaries, and then providing feedback to 
implementers in government, and specifically the DRDLR officials in the province. 
From there, we provided further feedback to beneficiaries regarding the views of the 
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DRDLR, and also provided updates to them regarding changes in policy and discussed 
how these would affect them, and how they planned to interact with the Department in 
view of its new policies: the State Land Lease and Disposal Policy and the Recapitalisation 
and Development Programme. 
 
Summary findings 
Our findings show the stark contrast between proclaimed policy aims and realities on 
the ground. Across all our thematic areas of enquiry, the policy principles of tenure 
security, poverty reduction, gender equity, sustainable land use, and resilient rural 
livelihoods appear to have foundered in practice. Here we present in summary some key 
findings. 
 
No beneficiaries had current documented land rights 
Although government policy emphasises the need for tenure security, and aims to achieve 
this through the provision of long-term leases, we found that beneficiaries did not have 
leases in any of our case study projects. The only two valid leases among the sample were 
concluded between government and strategic partners (i.e., agribusiness companies), not 
the ostensible ‘beneficiaries’. The inability of beneficiaries to pay rent to the state has led 
officials to institute a practice of issuing ‘caretakership’ agreements (mostly lapsed) in 
order to absolve beneficiaries of a need to pay for their land. Under such agreements, 
rather than being rights-holders, they are given a duty to look after state property for a 
limited period, normally three months, with the state being able to give them 30 days’ 
notice to vacate the property. In one case, a family was granted permission to occupy a 
state farm (without a lease), and asked by the DRDLR to deliver an informal eviction 
notice to those already occupying it. This is possibly the opposite of the vision of secure 
long-term rights for black South Africans which was at the core of land reform as 
envisaged in the 1990s; it was to end the situation of precarious tenure that colonial and 
apartheid governments entrenched. Situations in which people either have no 
documented rights, or have caretakerships or expired leases produce high degrees of 
uncertainty, leading people to avoid investment in land use, production or maintenance 
of infrastructure. This means that ‘beneficiaries’ have little or no tenure security. In a twist 
of Orwellian irony, the ‘beneficiaries’ may not benefit at all, but are allowed to be 
temporary squatters on land over which they have no rights. 
 
Our sample is summarised in Table 1, indicating the tenure status prevailing at each 
project (i.e., farm). 
 
In addition to the situation of chronic tenure insecurity, there are widespread and 
inaccurate expectations among beneficiaries that they will become owners of the land 
they occupy and use. The adoption of the SLLDP in July 2013 – which extends the period 
of leasehold prior to ownership to 50 years – was not communicated to any of the projects 
in our sample until we distributed copies of the policy and explained it. This unpublicised 
about-turn in policy suggests political risk in the future as large numbers of people around 
the country discover that their expectations of gaining ownership of the land they now 
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occupy will not be met. Our findings suggest a need either to revisit the state’s policy of 
retaining ownership and managing state land leases, or to implement profound changes 
in the system of state land administration to ensure that people occupying state land 
acquire secure rights and are able to build their livelihoods on this land. 
 
 
 
The absence of secure land rights impedes production support 
The lack of clarity about the status of beneficiaries’ tenure has practical implications. Other 
state institutions such as the provincial Department of Agriculture and Rural 
Development refuse to deliver services or invest in their land uses. People are not able to 
access credit as financial institutions require some proof of their right to occupy. As a 
result, emerging commercial farmers, including those who have capital from other 
sources, are being stymied in their farming operations. This is due to an inability to 
secure loans and other sources of support, and to make on-farm improvements, because 
they do not have valid leases. Further, we discovered cases where beneficiaries who 
were making improvements to their infrastructure – fixing a shed roof, renovating farm 
worker housing, or putting up fences – were told by DRDLR officials to cease such fixed 
improvements on government property. Without rights, access to land does not translate 
into opportunities for development. 
 
State institutions are working at cross purposes 
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Our findings point to a stand-off between key state ministries, notably those responsible 
for land reform and for agriculture. Provincial agricultural officials we interviewed 
indicated that they will not provide support to these projects, because of a lack of 
long-term leases but also because of a perception that since DRDLR has funds under its 
Recapitalisation and Development Programme, agricultural authorities have no 
responsibilities to deliver on their mandate of agricultural support. These two departments 
have no shared policy framework or coordinated input at project level, with the result 
that some people get land without any support to use it, are sent back and forth 
between departments, and may wait many years after occupation for any infrastructure 
or production support. The current policy model requires renegotiation of state 
institutions’ roles. 
 
Farm workers face increased tenure insecurity and livelihood 
uncertainty 
The proactive purchase model means that, from the moment of transfer, when farms 
become state property, all commercial operations cease, with profound impacts on farm 
workers – who are usually also resident on farm. When government buys farms, farm 
workers lose their jobs and often their only sources of cash income. In contrast, the 
(usually white) farm owners who sell to the state are paid out in full and can create 
alternative livelihoods elsewhere. Farm workers – without their own capital to invest, and 
without leases or any recognised rights to the land – are therefore isolated from 
development opportunities. Some former farm workers who continue to live on the 
farms expressed feelings of deep insecurity, now that they are not employees of private 
farmers, but undocumented occupiers of state-owned land. Special consideration may be 
needed to treat farm  dwellers  differently  from  other  beneficiaries,  especially  to  avoid  
the  pattern  of farm workers losing their jobs as a result of state acquisition. 
 
There is evidence of elite capture – and state collusion with agribusiness 
We found in two cases that government has concluded leases with the strategic partners 
(i.e., agribusiness companies), rather than with ‘beneficiaries’ themselves, who therefore 
neither own the land nor lease it, but remain workers on state farms, working for strategic 
partners. In both cases the people involved as strategic partners are established farmers or 
representatives of large agribusinesses and all those we came across were white men. A key 
condition for financial support from the DRDLR is that beneficiaries must have either a 
strategic partner (to operate the farm on their behalf) or a mentor (to advise them how 
to do so). This is why beneficiaries often enter into such partnerships; yet in the two 
cases we came across, the agribusiness company itself started the project and, having 
acquired farms from the state, signed up the farm workers as ‘beneficiaries’ to be registered 
in the official database. Beneficiaries in these strategic partnership projects lack control 
over land, capital and production. There is no clarity on whether strategic partners are 
vetted, by whom and how. Strategic partners and mentors garner tangible benefits: 
mentors receive monthly cash payments from the state for playing this role, while strategic 
partners hold shares in joint ventures while benefiting from state subsidies and access to 
state land. In three cases we found that the strategic partners owned downstream 
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processing and packing factories, to which they sold the farm produce, enabling transfer 
pricing. In one case, the ‘strategic partner’ was an agribusiness which ran the PLAS farm as 
its own operation, directly siphoning the produce to its processing facility, without 
payment to the ‘beneficiaries’, whom it treated as employees (and paid below minimum 
wage) on the farm the state claimed to have bought for them. Such cases comprehensively 
draw into question whether state funds for ‘redistribution’ are being used to provide 
(white) agribusinesses with cheap or free access to land in the name of redistributing 
land to (black) rural people. To the extent to which this is more widespread, it begs the 
question of why this is the case – and the degree to which the phenomenon can be 
attributed to corruption and collusion by the state officials who sanction such deals, or 
to attempts by officials to ensure commercial production even at the cost of 
redistributing land or wealth to the ostensible beneficiaries. 
 
Conclusions 
South Africa’s land reform seems to have succumbed to the ingrained scepticism held by 
officials in successive departments of ‘native affairs’ and ‘bantu affairs’ about secure and 
independent land rights for black people (Cousins and Walker 2015; Hall 2015; Hall 
and Williams 2003). Conditional tenure – under the authority of the state or traditional 
institutions – is a key way in which black rural populations can be controlled, and their 
failure to use land in compliance with official designs forms, once again, the basis for 
them to lose land. As Colin Murray and Gavin Williams (1994, 320), introducing the 
Land and freedom special issue of ROAPE aptly observed, when it comes to land, 
people ‘do not generally like to be told what to use it for or how to use it’. Yet land reform in 
the past 20 years has gone from prioritising secure tenure as a basis for poor black South 
Africans to make their own land-use decisions to a highly prescriptive managerial 
approach which contributes to the privileging of sustaining commercial land use over 
providing secure tenure and preference for wealthy beneficiaries or agribusinesses. This 
we characterise as a form of ‘productionism’ that has altered the foundational logic of 
redistribution. 
 
Long-standing debates about the market-based land reform approach centre on 
whether, if market price is to be paid, class relations are really being changed (Borras 
2003). What we have witnessed in our research is that this latest phase of land 
redistribution is taking the ‘market’ to the next level. While the state is playing a more 
interventionist role by purchasing land itself, it is not challenging the supremacy of 
private property but rather becoming a significant player in the land market. And the 
capitalist logic of land reform has extended from market participation (to acquire the 
land) to expectations of commercial production (to use the land) in ways that militate 
against secured land access for the poor. When beneficiaries clearly cannot invest in and 
operate commercial farms, they are to be sidelined in favour of agribusinesses that can 
do so. The result, as we found in our field research, is a two-tiered land reform in 
which some (white-owned) agribusinesses garner handouts from the state, while poor 
families and communities who have accessed state land are left with insecure tenure and 
livelihoods. Our findings indicate a contorted reform governed by state officials, 
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consultants and agribusiness ‘strategic partners’ concerned with surveillance and control 
of ‘beneficiaries’ in ‘projects’ with precarious tenure on un-subdivided commercial farms 
now owned by the state. 
 
Without redistribution of power and wealth to those who are the ostensible beneficiaries, 
is it even land reform? And what political function does land reform of this kind actually 
perform? These are questions our research will address further as it unfolds. For now, 
we offer this briefing to alert readers concerned with questions of rural political economy 
in South Africa to the dramatic and largely undocumented redefinition of land reform 
and the profound threat of state control and elite capture opened up by this latest policy 
change. 
 
Notes 
1. Approximately 0.3% of the national budget. 
2. Ranwedzi (2012) is a Masters degree mini-thesis by a state official and supervised by one 
of the authors. 
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